Disclaimer

This site is intended solely to showcase the resources and services of the Combined Arms Research Library. The information in this site does not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Department of the Army. Any mention of or use of a product or company name is for educational purposes and does not constitute an endorsement by the Department of the Army, Combined Arms Center Fort Leavenworth or the US Army Command and General Staff College.

Wednesday, January 23, 2008

RAND Paper: Money in the Bank -- Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations

Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations

Summary "As insurgent threats evolve and assume new forms, the United States must also evolve in its ability to counter potentially prolonged threats in several parts of the world. Because of the potential for global reach in contemporary insurgencies, the ability to draw on lessons learned from past counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns using different historical cases can be valuable, helping current and future leaders prevent a repetition of mistakes and building a foundation on which to build contemporary responses. To this end, six historic COIN operations from the 19th and 20th centuries are examined to determine which tactics, techniques, and procedures led to success and which to failure. The Philippines, Algeria, Vietnam, El Salvador, Jammu and Kashmir, and Colombia were chosen for their varied characteristics relating to geography, historical era, outcome, type of insurgency faced, and level of U.S. involvement. Specific issues examined include the counterinsurgents’ ability to innovate and adapt, the need to find a way to recognize the threat, and tactics for confronting it."
Download PDF Full Document

(File size 1.2 MB, 5 minutes modem, <>

0 comments:

Books in the News

Loading...
Add the CARL Toolbar to your Web Browser